

The Hamas-Iranian relationship and its trans-national impact

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Introduction

Hamas is a unique actor in Middle Eastern politics: an Islamic movement with a domestic agenda and domestic activities, Hamas is also a transnational actor capable of regional consequences. The impact of its ideology and tactics has inadvertently and indirectly risen to a regional scale¹. The chief feature of the rise and popularity of Hamas has been its active use of political Islam to rally support for its constructive and destructive actions. Political Islam has been on the rise since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and examples of political Islam groups can be identified in nearly every Arab country. The strategy of political Islam has been to blame any failures within states or the region, with particular focus on economic conditions and quality of life, on the secular nature of the regimes. They claim that only a return to true Islam will free Muslims from the tyranny of their oppressive states².

However, the historical growth of Hamas was not in tradition with the Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—who radicalized Islamic ideology and proclaimed the religious right of the *faqih* (Islamic jurist) to rule the nation—or Muhammad Taqi Shari'ati, an Iranian scholar-politician who revolutionized the religion of the pious faithful by resurrecting the old Shiite spirit of revolt and martyrdom³. Hamas was an outcome of the Muslim Brotherhood, an international Sunni movement, of which Hamas is the Palestinian chapter⁴.

Hamas is even more unique, for when its founding organisation argued against nationalism for a united Islamic Umma, Hamas itself decided to adopt a nationalist policy in order to secure that representative legitimacy⁵. Hamas's emergence as a standard-bearer of national resistance was the result of a painful transformation within the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had traditionally stood aloof from the struggle against the occupation, for which it was rewarded during the 1970s with a cosy relationship with Israel. But when the intifada burst upon the Gaza Strip in December 1987, a radical change in approach was required, not least because the Brotherhood had also been losing in popularity to the smaller Islamic Jihad, whose acts of resistance against the occupation during the 1980s had done much to ignite the uprising. The Brotherhood had to reverse its priorities: its policy of "re-Islamizing" society, manifested in an impressive social and welfare network (which it used to compete with Fatah for the minds and hearts of the Palestinians), was henceforth insufficient, and it would now have to join the common struggle. The result was a separate, activist arm that it named Hamas, meaning "zeal," but also the acronym for the movement's official title, Harakat al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement)⁶.

¹ Carol, Will, 'Hamas and Arab states: A trans-national socialist movement's impact on regime states', pg.3 accessed at <http://triceratops.brynmawr.edu/dspace/handle/10066/728> (last accessed February 28 2008)

² Ibid,pg.23

³ Muslih, Muhammad, 'Foreign policy of Hamas', Council Of Foreign Relations, 1999,pg.8

⁴ Satloff, Robert, 'The rogue strikes back: Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah v/s Israel', accessed at <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/442luknw.asp> (last accessed 28 February 2008)

⁵ Carol,pg.37

⁶ Kristianasen, Wendy, 'Challenge and Counter challenge: Hamas's challenge to Oslo', Journal of Palestinian Studies, 28/3, 1999, pg.20

Islamic Jihad is an organisation which itself owes its roots to the Muslim Brotherhood. It was established in 1979, as a military organisation by disaffected members of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was the Iranian revolution, Islamic Jihad spokesmen argued, which brought home the old truth that "Islam was the solution and Jihad was the proper means". They adopted a central tenet of Khomeini's interpretation of the new Shiite, the constant emphasis on jihad as a symbol of activism, thereby contrasting it with the Muslim Brotherhood's approach. They adopted the principle of sacrifice and martyrdom to an uninhibited suicidal point.

The Iranian revolution was restricted in its first decade of existence to the Shiite movements in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf Emirates, largely owing to the cultural rivalry between the two sects of Islam. However, Islamic Jihad while steeped in the Sunni dominated Gaza Strip was emboldened and inspired by the Iranian revolution. A change occurred in the late eighties. Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran no longer restricted itself to the Shiite domains: instead. It opened itself up to a genuine effort to export its revolution to Sunni-populated areas, such as Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and the Palestinian arena. The change in Iran's external policies coincided with the eruption of the intifada which brought to the fore the saliency of Islamic militancy in the form not only of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement but, more forcibly, through Hamas. Following the deportation of the Islamic Jihad leadership to Lebanon in 1988, Iranian involvement with the organization was significantly enhanced⁷.

Hamas did not subscribe to the views of the Iranian revolution with Ahmad Yassin, the leader of Hamas, attacking at that time Khomeini's regime. As a member of the Sunni dominated Muslim Brotherhood group, the organisation espoused heavy anti-Shiite rhetoric and also it sought to preserve its relationship with its benefactors which were Sunni Saudi Arabia and Kuwait⁸.

In recent years however, the relationship of Hamas to its traditional backers has changed, and the growth of the Hamas can be viewed as trans-national threat to the governments in the region. Furthermore, the relationship between Hamas and Iran has also been greatly bolstered by the new administration of President Ahmadenijad, which has provided the Iranian regime with an additional proxy force against Israel and renewed tensions with Sunni rivals. This paper argues that the Hamas-Iranian relationship is detrimental to the complex regional relationships among states in the region exposing the trans-regional linkages within.

Hamas as an Islamic Social Movement

Hamas has devoted itself to the destruction of Israel in order to realize its objective of an independent and Islamic Palestine. Hamas is most widely known as a terrorist organization due to its violent attacks, including suicide bombings, on Israeli forces and citizens. However, it also provides much needed social services to Palestinians. Hamas runs hospitals, schools, clinics, religious institutions, and other such services that would otherwise not be

⁷ Rekhes, Ellie, 'The Terrorist Connection-Iran, Islamic Jihad and Hamas', Justice, 5, May 1995, accessed at http://www.totse.com/en/politics/terrorists_and_freedom_fighters/isrlters.html (last accessed at February 28, 2008)

⁸ 'Iran Hamas Relations: The growing threat from a radical religious coalition', The Henry Jackson Society: A strategic briefing. Accessed at <http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercollectionitems/HJS%20Strategic%20Briefing%20-%20Iran-Hamas%20Relations.pdf> (last accessed at February 28,2008)

provided⁹. The success of the social assistance provided by Hamas to Palestinians is not lost out on its rivals. The group allocates approximately 95 percent of its \$70 million annual budget to these social programs, a budget which a PLO worker acknowledges certainly helps people¹⁰.

It is within the Gaza Strip that Hamas carries out the majority of its social services and its terrorist attacks are planned, as well as where its popularity is highest among Palestinians. Recent events have shown Hamas adopting a more political approach, but the objectives of resisting Israeli occupation and establishing an Islamic state in Palestine are unwavering. Hamas is a local actor undertaking domestic operations directed toward achieving a domestic goal: the creation of an Islamic state over the whole of Palestine¹¹. Today, Palestine is arguably the centre of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and therefore receives attention from all of the Arab states. Hamas' actions therefore have an increased effect on the region as a whole, due to its undeniable presence in a state of regional importance¹². The tactics adopted by Hamas towards the realisation of its goal, invariably has implications on similar groups which operate outside the territories.

This is because, social movements, particularly successful ones tend to be emulated by people with a common identity or purpose. In this way Hamas can operate within Palestine but mobilize Muslims or Arabs across the Middle East who believe in the elimination of Israel or the establishment of Islamic states¹³. It is important to understand the ground sentiments in the Arab states. According to the President of the Counter-Intelligence Centre- David Major, many Arabs believe that the reason for their losses against Israel lie in the fact that they were becoming irreligious. To them Allah (God) was not on their side and therefore to be victorious they would have to become pious Muslims. This resulted in Islam gaining prominence in political and social discourses, and hence the popular support to Islamic groups fighting against Israel¹⁴.

This is an important element for the increasing support for Hamas, which derives popularity not only with its successful strikes against Israeli targets, but also because it is an organisation which provides the best alternative to the secular but corrupt governance provided by the PLO. Hamas's popularity can be traced to its active opposition to the peace process under the Oslo accords. To some extent, the Oslo framework has contributed to the rise of Hamas, as it delegitimized any political force outside the political elite that signed up to it, and offered no credible non-violent ways of protesting either against its content or against Israel's non-compliance with its content¹⁵.

Liberation is not Hamas's only goal. The Islamization of society—the process of making Islam more central to public and private life which, besides a focus on Islamic law, includes concerns for social justice, leadership accountability and democratic participation—is as important, if not more so. Prior to the first *intifada*, it was these latter goals that the Islamic movement sought to advance, while the goal of liberation was placed on the back-

⁹ Carol,pg.4

¹⁰ Ibid,pg.39

¹¹ Ibid,pg.5

¹² Ibid,pg.6

¹³ Ibid,pg.7

¹⁴ Excerpt of an audio podcast accessed at <http://cicentre.com/podcasts/220.mp3> (accessed 27 March 2008)

¹⁵ Gunning, Jeroen 'Peace with Hamas: The political transformation', International Affairs, 80/2, 2004, pg.238

burner¹⁶. This was reflected in the charter of Hamas which declares- When faith is lost, there is no security¹⁷. A large part of Hamas' regional popularity hinges on the centrality of Palestine to the Arab and Muslim worlds. Hamas depicts Palestine as a critical, central piece in the Arab world and emphasizes its religious prominence within Islam, for the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven from Jerusalem¹⁸.

The concept of Transnational Terrorist Social Movements (TTSMs) combines the work on transnational social movement theory and transnational terrorism theory to most accurately describe the transnational effects of sub-state actors like Hamas. A TTSM is a domestic movement that uses terrorism as its primary course of action but utilizes various components of social movement theory to increase its influence. The dual nature of this model allows an actor to have effects at both the state level and the popular level, hence a direct and indirect effect on the regime, respectively. Terrorism is a concern at the state level. The presence of this volatile form of violence in the region creates inherent instability and is a threat to the norms governing the state system. At the popular level, Hamas' use of Islamic rhetoric and institutions plays into the common identity in the region. This can foster support for Hamas' cause, and it can inspire others to mobilize¹⁹. For example, in an interview, Hamas leader Mahmud Zarhar stated "Palestine is in the Arab world. The Arab world is in the Islamic world."²⁰

A TTSM like Hamas that does not actively organize Islamic groups or supporters in other countries may still achieve the same result due to an adoption of its structure and strategies by movements in other Arab countries. Additionally, the threat of terrorism is increased because of its ability to spread when adopted by oppositional forces in other Arab states²¹. Hamas is viewed as an exceptional entity, for it is not explicitly a transnational organization. Its transnational effects are incidental, not organized or institutionalized, and its influence relies upon a number of different transnational elements. There are three ways in which Hamas may be considered to be transnational: as a social movement, as a terrorist organization, and as an Islamic group²².

It should however be noted, that Hamas has traditionally avoided any organised communication with groups operating in the Arab world. This is because Hamas does not wish to be viewed as a potential security threat in the regions it operates out off. It has adopted a policy of universal support for Arab and Islamic states and movements, not supporting any one over the other or encouraging alliances against any particular regime. Hamas does not commit itself to furthering the cause of every Islamic movement in the Middle East, but rather hopes that they will aid its cause. Hamas has given public support to political Islam groups only as a form of solidarity for Hamas' own benefit, but not as an attempt to incite them against their own governments²³.

The group's statements directed toward the Muslim community are words of solidarity and unity in purpose. There is no intention of inciting the mobilization of similar movements within other countries. Arab regimes are

¹⁶ Ibid,pg.241

¹⁷ Gordon, Neve & Filc, Dani, 'Hamas and the Destruction of Risk Society', *Constellations*, 12/4, 2005,pg.542

¹⁸ Carol,pg.40

¹⁹ Carol,pg.7

²⁰ Zahhar, Mahmud & Hijazi, Hussein, 'Hamas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self-Destruct: An Interview with Mahmud Zahhar', *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 24/3, 1995, pg.84

²¹ Carol,pg.7

²² Ibid,pg.11

²³ Ibid,pg.55

nevertheless affected by Hamas' influence on their citizenries. Hamas has built up regional support for its cause as well as for the wider ideology of political Islam. Both of these factors, brought about through the spread of framed information, place the reality of Hamas within other Arab states²⁴. Political Islam groups are well aware of the activities and successes of Hamas. Through the diffusion of information, these groups learn those policies and practices most advantageous to their own cause. Whether or not Hamas intends it, its domestic operations can strengthen the cause of Islamists in other Arab states²⁵.

The Iranian connection

The active cooperation of Hamas and Iran in the aftermath of the 2005 Palestinian election results have further served to highlight the trans-regional impact of Hamas. Iran supported the Palestinian cause and its support took several forms: the closing of the embassy of Israel and the inauguration in its place of the embassy of Palestine immediately after the overthrow of the shah in March 1979; the creation of governmental and nongovernmental institutions for the collection of donations for the Palestinian people; and the expression of concern over Palestinian issues, particularly Jerusalem²⁶. However, as mentioned earlier, the relationship between Hamas and Iran was not cordial, not merely on a religious basis but also on the realpolitik fact that Hamas did not wish to antagonise relations with Egypt, Jordan and other Arab states.

Iran's interests were in mobilizing Shiites in the Gulf, in supporting international terror, and in building up Hezbollah with a sectarian-flavoured radicalism. Iran began supporting the organization financially and Hezbollah trained some of the 415 Hamas members, expelled by Israel in 1995 to Marj al-Zuhur, in the art of terrorism. The newly established cooperation was reportedly formalized in an agreement signed in late 1992 in the city of Kum. Iran allowed Hamas to open an office in Teheran for political and propaganda activities, subsequently referred to by both parties as an embassy²⁷. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin repeated the egregious mistake of allowing the repatriation of terrorists, which ushered in a new era of terrorism. New heights of lethality arose: the advent of the suicide bomber. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, coupled with Palestinian violence since 2000, culminated in an electoral victory for Hamas in January 2006. Palestinian violence, but more critically the death of Arafat and Hamas' realization that it had been beaten by Israeli counterterrorism, caused the group to take the political realist route.

The election victory demonstrated that Hamas, in capturing a quasi-state, could help Iran become the power behind the proxies in its quest for regional hegemony. The new Hamas-led government increasingly gravitated towards Iran, as Iran increasingly cooperated with Hamas. While Hamas continued to view Hezbollah as a rival, it dawned in a new power-relationship which offered state patronage and the benefits of the same²⁸. The new era of a warmer Hamas-Iran relationship followed a change in Iranian self-perception from what Hillel Frisch called, 'a

²⁴ Ibid,pg.58

²⁵ Ibid,pg.56

²⁶ Ibid,pg.22

²⁷ Rekhes, Op Cit

²⁸ Frisch, Hillel, 'The Iran-Hamas alliance: Threat or folly', Perspectives Paper 28, 1 May 2007, BESA, accessed at <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives28.html> (last accessed 28 February 2008)

religious Bolshevik revolution' into a 'Stalinisation of Iranian politics.' In the Stalinisation period, Iran started to view itself as a radicalised state power and began its search for like-minded clients in the region²⁹.

For Hamas, after the elections was an isolated party, which was provided a lifeline by Iranian leadership under Ahmadanijad. In December 2006, Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh stated publicly that 'Iran constituted 'strategic depth' for the Palestinians', the first time any declaration of support for Iran had been made openly by Hamas' leadership. Hamas's ties to Iran during this period have become so close that the intelligence chief of the rival PA government speculated that Iran masterminded and commended the Hamas's coup against the Palestinian Authority in June 2007 and its violent takeover of Gaza. According to some analysts, Iran purposely fostered the relationship in order that the 'final word' on matters regarding Israel would be Teheran's, akin already to its relationship with Hezbollah vis-à-vis Lebanon³⁰.

This alliance has proved to be a bitter pill to swallow for the Sunni states in the region. They view the rising Shiite power ascendancy to be a direct threat to their traditional bastions of power, and have viewed with strong concern the Iranian influence rising in countries including Afghanistan and Iraq. The fact that the Gaza strip was now firmly in Iranian proxy can be inferred from the statement made by Hamas political leader Khaled Mashal when he threatened military strikes in retaliation of attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. A nuclear Iran is of grave concern to both Sunni Arab states and Israel³¹.

Arab states realise that the alliance with Hamas is a key part of Iran's larger Levant strategy whereby it acquires powerful regional clients to sow the seeds of the Islamic revolution. This strategy is intended to bring Iran one step closer to establishing a caliphate that would spearhead a pan-Islamic jihad against the West, most notably the United States and Israel. An example of the pan regional impact of this alliance is directly witnessed in Egypt. A majority of the Egyptian population are sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, and it is feared that a Hamas dominated neighbouring state could create domestic upheavals³². The fear of the Iranian influence over a Pan-Arab emotive issue such as Palestine has forced traditional hardliner states to push forward alternatives. The Saudi government for example, has advocated its peace plan titled the "Mecca peace" which supports the PLO operating in the West Bank. It further demands that Hamas distance itself from Iran for it to be eligible for similar financial windfalls³³.

It is quite telling on the influence wielded by Iran, considering that Hamas has not been crippled despite the financial cut off. While civilians have been inconvenienced, Hamas continued to find it prudent to launch rocket attacks against Israel, which resulted in a fresh military offensive in the Gaza strip³⁴. In addition, the reports that

²⁹ Iran Hamas Relations: The growing threat from a radical religious coalition', The Henry Jackson Society: A strategic briefing

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Middle East: Analyst Discusses Relations Between Iran And Hamas: Radio Free Europe accessed at <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/01/175fa8ce-21e8-4a2f-a586-133bc1fc90d2.html> (last accessed 28 February 2008)

³² Wurmser, Meyrav, 'The Iran-Hamas Alliance' Focus, Fall 2007, accessed at <http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/article/57> (Last accessed 28 February 2008)

³³ Iran Hamas Relations: The growing threat from a radical religious coalition', The Henry Jackson Society: A strategic briefing, pg.3

³⁴ International Herald Tribune, 'Hamas rocket kills Israeli', 28 February 2008

Egyptian Interior Minister Habib El-Adly had evidence of Hamas having perpetuated attacks in Egypt, show the defiance of this group³⁵. An example of the help extended by Iran in propping up the regime is when Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar was briefly stopped, but otherwise unhindered, as he transited through the international airport in Cairo with seven suitcases stuffed with an estimated \$20 million³⁶.

Conclusion

Iran employs its clients as a part of a greater effort to seek regional domination both in Arab Shiites and Arab Sunni communities that it hopes to penetrate and incite. Various Sunni Arab regimes fear Iran's growing influence among the various Shiite communities of the Middle East and that a radical Shiite crescent could emerge and topple moderate Arab states. King Abdallah II of Jordan first sounded the alarm in December 2004 when he spoke about a rising Shiite crescent that would overwhelm the Sunni Arab world. This crescent would encompass Iran, the newly empowered Shiite majority in Iraq, Syria whose ruling Alawite minority elite are recognised as Shiite by some Shiite clerics and finally Lebanon whose Shiite population is growing and where Hezbollah's influence is becoming more pervasive. Echoing Abdallah's concerns, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated in April 2006 that 'the Shiites are always loyal to Iran and not to the countries in which they live'³⁷. According to Palestinian human rights leader Bassem Eid, in an interview in November 2006, "Hamas now represents Iranian interests, not Palestinian interests. Iran's goal is to destroy Israel and they are forcing the Palestinians to do the job through Hamas." Reuven Berko, former Islamic Affairs Advisor to the Israel Police, noted, "It is clear now to all the players in the region that the United States, Israel and the Arab states are on one side; and Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas are on the other"³⁸.

The Iranian rise in the Palestinian territories should also be viewed in connection with the declining interest of Arab states towards the Palestinian cause. Off late, many Arab states have been less likely to find support for Palestine within their national interest. This is a result of the solidification of states and the state system, replacing the pan-Arab nature of the region. States are now focused on their national interest, which does not always coincide with Hamas' vision of the defence of Palestine. This is particularly true for states such as Jordan and Egypt, both of which have ongoing peace agreements with Israel. Hamas has nevertheless helped to bring the Palestine question to the attention of Arab governments through its connection to the Arab populations. Hamas' transnational influence incites Arab citizens to demand action on behalf of their regional identity. Response to the Palestine question is pushed onto the national stage by Hamas and the Arab societies, despite the fact that it may not coincide with the state's agenda or interests³⁹.

Hamas has helped to rally popular support for Palestinians in Arab populations throughout the Middle East. Governments that give too little recognition, whether material or rhetorical, to this issue will face political

³⁵ Krauss I., Michael & Pham, Peter J., 'Our Blind Spot: Hamas and Saudi Arabia', accessed at <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YzgwZWFjNDQ1MMDM3ZDNlODQ0NDYzYTFiYjc4ZGQ4OTU> (last accessed 28 February 2008)

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Iran Hamas Relations: The growing threat from a radical religious coalition', The Henry Jackson Society: A strategic briefing, Pg.3

³⁸ Iran and Hamas, pg.47

³⁹ Carol, pg.64

consequences from their populations⁴⁰. For Arab states, Hamas proves to be a double edged sword. On one hand, it would like to express support for a group which actively opposes the state of Israel while on the other the tactics and support of Hamas lend it credence as a threat to the regimes in the region. Hamas' most visual and well-publicized tactic is certainly terrorism. Arab states that see Hamas employing violence to advance the goal of an Islamic state have to be concerned with the potential diffusion of terrorism. Regime fears are likely moderated because of the large ideological and theological differences between attacking non-Muslim occupiers and fellow Muslims. Nevertheless, the possibility of violence on any scale can be destabilizing to regimes⁴¹.

The Iranian support to the Hamas regime also disturbs the Sunni states greatly. The popularity of a Iranian supported group within the Sunni states, it is feared could lead to domestic political upheavals. The Sunnis are accustomed to regarding the Shiites as inferior, and the Sunnis see them as a threat to the established order. Moreover, this particular Iranian leadership is in an apocalyptic state of mind, a Shiite apocalypse in which the hidden imam or Mahdi emerges from hiding. The Sunnis, of course, have their own Mahdi, but their political endgame is tied more explicitly, as bin Laden hopes, to the restoration of the caliphate. Shiite Mahdiism, expressed in Ahmadinejad's speeches, means to overthrow the established order. In other words, it is clear that the major issue in the region for the foreseeable future is a clash between Sunnis and Shiites. That could mean the Israel-Arab issue will be marginalized, and that Sunni and Shiite extremists may show less interest in targeting U.S. troops in Iraq and more in killing fellow Muslims.

The Iranian revolution, like the Russian revolution, is a real one and "it has now reached the Stalinist phase," as Historian Bernard Lewis has noted. Accordingly, the Sunni leadership is worried⁴². These concerns of the Sunni states are reflected in the statements made during the recent Hezbollah-Israel conflict. Lebanese government under Prime Minister Fuad Siniora and the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt levelled sharp criticism at Hizbullah for "dragging the entire region into a war with Israel." Lebanese commentator Joseph Bishara, writing in the Saudi-owned *Elaph* website, said that "Syria and Iran are the real enemies of Lebanon." This was an unprecedented development in the region – Muslim leaders blaming Hizbullah, Iran and Syria, rather than Israel, for causing the war⁴³.

On a wider scale, Hamas has achieved control over a territory which can serve as a refuge and a base for other Brotherhood movements. History has shown that such states have been actively used by Islamists-Sudan being a prime example under Hasan at-Turabi. Among the individuals Turabi sheltered was Al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden⁴⁴. It is therefore no surprise to see that the Hamas-Iranian relationship is viewed with concern. It hence provides an example of the trans-regional impact of an alliance between a domestic state actor and an International sovereign, particularly in a conflict.

⁴⁰ Ibid,pg.65

⁴¹ Ibid,pg.57

⁴² Carol,pg.48

⁴³ Carol,pg.46

⁴⁴ Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Global Jihad (Mutiple Authors), Pg.65 accessed at <http://www.jcpa.org/text/iran-hizbullah-hamas.pdf>, (Last accessed 28 February 2008)

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